Virtual Speech Acts

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Abstract. There is a fundamental ontological premise that must be made when it comes to online communications. Virtual reality, where "virtual" does not mean "not true", as it is generally understood, has its own peculiar laws. I'll show that it requires more than an empirical analysis of "acts" of virtual language.

1 INTRODUCTION

First are defined the sender and the receiver of the speech act, which are no longer two or more speakers, as in a direct dialogue between people in the same place, but they are always the sender and the average computing that refers to an indefinite and indeterminate receiver which in turn is de-ending with the maximum set of senders in the domain of the possible participants in the online dialogue, and here I will call simply Community of Digital Talking (CPT). I think it should be noted that the CPT should not be considered as the total ceiling of absolute interlocutors of the WEB, but as the ceiling on regional virtual ontology interlocutors on which it is acting linguistically and therefore already implicitly defines the virtual set of interlocutors meeting the requirements of that specific regional virtual ontology. It is evident that in this way you cut net all empathic production that forms the implied premise of the dialogue that provide linguistic agents an ideal representation of the possible knowledge base and beliefs that our interlocutor leads being, and thus making them appear, himself (this physical type, the poise, the place of dialogue, the role it plays in society and on the shortcut language reference etc.).

Against this background there is a breach of the G. Berruto diagram which assigns a proportionally direct relation to the change in "diamesian", "diatopics", "diachronic" and "diaphasics" axes, Since it fixes the "diamesian" axis on a data processing, other axes do not find a direct match because 'impersonal nature of the CDT. So, also it remains undefined (you can not understand the cultural level of the speech or its "chronicity" being, an online dialogue "eternal"). This has a direct consequence on the ethics of speech that it is not supported by a real relation between language agents. They do not find the fit for actualize and then trivially do not feel guilty about not answer a question on a forum not being defined our interlocutor. However, in a personal economy of discourse, assuming a standard situation, the sender attempts to conserve inherent tendency to 'true' and then you feel uncomfortable in saying what is false. At this point, taking the SDRT in which a listener constructs a mental model of the discourse in defining act as a structure, one should ask how it is possible to satisfy the truth value of the sentences if, as said so far, no one has the opportunity to intersect the representational domains of linguistic agents of the speech act. In this way the syntax of SDRT does not find referents of the discourse from which to extrapolate the implied conditions of the discourse itself. Similarly one should ask what could be the list of propositions, acting as axioms, arising from the commitment store in an online dialogue. Virtual linguistic practices, thus, risk becoming self-referential solipsism as there is the risk of losing real "language game". This will alter the semantic and pragmatic values of the speech act that becomes just personal reflection based solely and uniquely on its representational structure stimulated, not from another linguistic agent with its own structure and its own background knowledge and beliefs, but a "dynamic text" (even imagining a direct / indirect chat) that can not be assigned the standard denotation. By talking to an "other self", stressing the term "other", you retrieve the novelty of information deriving from another agent who immediately returns the usefulness and goodness of a data processing that, based on specific cases and defining uniquely the source, appears to be inescapable goal of knowledge and communication. In fact this otherness appears to be necessary but not sufficient condition to be able to speak of dialogue and communication as these presuppose an intentional relation to the poles of which are two rational entities.

From a philosophical point of view to talk about a virtual "pragmatism" seems a contradiction, because the performative act of language seems immobilized in virtual and immobile network. Basically you can say that language is an act when in a competition has a causal feedback, albeit not immediate, that first changes the agent's language preparation itself. But a virtual speech act has effects so immediate and concrete? The problem that seems most widespread Internet user is the ability to be untied from their identity and, through anonymity, taking from time to time a "new identity." The contribution that philosophy can give here is to try to understand the real meaning of those signs that seem to carry within itself a truth value untied by the speaker and as a result of his background of knowledge and beliefs.

The purpose of this article is to define, starting from an ontological analysis of communication entities, what they are and how virtual speech acts behave. With the advent of Internet networks, there has been a real revolution in communications and knowledge transmissions. Suddenly the web represented the immediate possibility of unlimited access to information usually not controlled. Beyond that, about a decade ago, it was born the phenomenon of social networks, where people, at least in appearance, was no longer a simple flow of information, but a corresponding communication to relationships with others. The first effects of this new way of "being friends" have shot down distances and canceled the passage of time (how many of us were able to find friends and acquaintances lost sight). However you can see the emergence of a paradox, because to reopen an old friendship through internet creates a schizophrenic relationship between who we were and who, with the passage of time, we have become making us feel compelled to be "the ones that we should be" for that specific knowledge placed at a precise time of our lives. The more immediate problem is created

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with the new "knowledge", as the actual report we are going to establish is not bound to the very nature of our being because we can assume any character identity. In virtual reality there is an undefined nature of linguistic agents in place. Given this premise we can not know whether the effects of that language, both constative that performative must be considered in accordance with a value of truth and actual veracity. The philosophy of language, in its classical view, analyzes the relationship between the linguistic sign and the facts of the world, placing in a precise location the effects that propositions have both on the sender and on the receiver of the speech: but how to apply them to the world virtual?

Even linguistic analysis does not find a precise definition as they jump the benchmarks to define the key variables which make a precise taxonomy of diachronic, diastratic and diaphasic, variations (they fixed the only possible variable, the diamesian one). Digital speakers, similar to how it happened for the journalistic language, feel free to create new rules of formation of language ranging from the phonetics to the syntax. To the extent that "language is the dress of thought [1], which is the relationship then between *signum* and *res* in the virtual language?

It will be appropriate to present a brief history of the results that the philosophy of language reached in defining its object in relation to a real-world and see if they can be reapplied to virtual ontology.

2 VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION

By crossing philosophy and linguistics, I refer in particular to the definition of the Russian linguist Roman Jakobson in which asserts that « the language must be studied in all the variety of its functions. To draw a picture of these features, you need a limited review of the constitutive factors of any linguistic process, every act of communication [...] <where> the sender sends a message to the recipient. To be effective, the message requires, in the first place, the reference to a context (the "contact person", according to another quite ambiguous definition), which can be obtained grabbed by the recipient, and that it is verbal, or likely to be minuted; secondly it requires an entirely, or at least partially, common code to the sender and to the recipient (or, in other words, to the encoder and the decoder of the message); Finally, a contact, a physical channel and psychological connection between the sender and the receiver, enabling them to establish and maintain communication.»[2].

Differently, philosophy investigates the conditions of communication possibilities as you can read from the Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein in which he wondered: « what is the language game of communicating? [...] We are so used to the communications done talking, conversing, that all that the juice of communication seems to be that other person grasp the meaning of my words [...] (As if it said: "The clock shows us the time. what is the time, is not yet decided. And to what end you read the time - here we do not care)»[3]. As you can see, a philosopher tries to investigate, beyond the given material of the passage and return information, forms of rationality underlying the language, such as meaning, reference, understanding, propositional act with which we go beyond the simple transmission and reception of sound, as « That we know what is happening Reaches far beyond the sounds That are all that is evident to gross observation: they are narrating events, asking questions, propounding hypotheses, advancing grounds and objections, and so forth. [...] What is to

do Those Things? » [4]. In fact it would seem that « the philosopher of language work concerns the analysis of the concepts that are commonly used to explain the structure and functioning of language » [5], but someone thinks that « the philosophy of language can not be distinguished by the language [...]. The relationship between the two areas of research is more complex [...] linguistics has always considered its relevance to the problem of linguistic meaning;»[6].

With respect to the definition of Jakobson communication, albeit through an average computer, you lose the characteristics described. In effect the communication passage takes place respecting the sending of a message from a sender to a receiver that sets the context, and is able to understand it and to verbalize in turn. From a philosophical point of view what is happening with respect to the meaning of the message, in my view, follows three fundamental moments: the meaning intended by the sender to transmit, the connotation/denotation of the virtual linguistic signs, and meaning that gives the recipient. Therefore, virtual communication is ultimately "communication", but produces different effects being necessarily filtered through ontological laws of cyber reality.

3 VIRTUAL SIGN BETWEEN SENSE AND MEANING

There are three dimensions of analysis of any language: the syntactic one, which concerns the relationship between the signs, the semantic one, which studies the relationship of signs with the things to which they apply, and the pragmatic one that examines the relationship of signs with speakers. For brevity, although it would be interesting to analyze the syntactic change of the Web language, we can not fathom the syntactic aspect being the only one, that does not change ontologically, as the average computer in this way behaves like the average "written language ". More interesting and relevant to the purpose of this article is to analyze the semantic and pragmatic aspects of virtual language.

Let us consider the useful example of Frege himself: « Let a, b, c of the straight lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of opposite sides. The point of a and b meeting coincides with b and c meeting place. We therefore different designations for the same point, and these names ("point of a and b match," "match point b and c") indicate also the manner in which the point is given [...] a sign (whether it is a name, a connection of words, a simple letter) is connected, in addition to what is designated, and what might be called the denotation of the sign, also what I would call the sense of the sign, and which contains the way in which the object is given. [...] Expressions as "the evening star" and "the morning star" are identical in denotation, but not in the way. [...] The designation of a single object can also consist of multiple words or other signs [...] As a rule, the relationships between the sign, its meaning and its denotation are these: sign corresponds to a certain way and this corresponds again a specific denotation, while a denotation (i.e. an object) belongs not only a sign. [...] But it is not at all certain that also corresponds to the way a denotation [...] from the denotation and the sense of a sign must be distinguished the representation [...] <that> is not always connected to the same effect, even in the same person. <In this sense> the denotation of a sentence is its truth value <that> must remain unchanged when replacing a part of the sentence with an expression having the same denotation but another way. And indeed that is the case. Leibniz gives the following definition: "*Eadem sunt, quae sibi mutuo substitui post, salva veritate*" »[7].

I wanted to retrace the beginnings of analytic philosophy and its analysis of the language as it faced with a new ontology, the virtual one. It must be "start over" with a systematic analysis of language and its effects. When the speaker writes online, be it a blog or a social network, the relationship between representation, meaning and significance does not undergo the same dynamics of the real world. In fact when the sender refers, second language proficiency, sense of denotation, all broad that distinguishes three stages and their relationships in the virtual world are compressed by identifying with one another, leaving the language in a state of *weak references*. Since the denotation is the truth value of the utterance, *weak references,* when the receiver assigns the same coordinates of the sender, becomes stronger.

The virtual ontology thus can be considered as pure potential where there is no pre-established determination. Similarly to a "quantum chaos" where the bits are not yet ranked in order to form specific and then words, set out characters, etc .; the signal, the in-formation from the sender defines the shape and the virtual synolon matter "creating"[2] it made its own virtual ontology *peri-optic*. All this then somehow justifies the possibility that the speaker has to take countless different virtual identity as the statements have a weak referential relationship with his scheme of being able to change representations "participation" according to the freedom of the speaker. So a dual ambiguity hangs over the language of the virtual entities finding themselves undefined, or rather weakly defined, both by the sender and the recipient.

In this way the deontic contribution of language follows the truth value of the utterance becoming true (good) in the occurrence of a matching with the denotation assigned the other speaker. So virtual propositions of ontology potential [8] alter the relationship between *signum* and *res* as the *signum.* The virtual world is the same *res*, freely created by the speaker digital and, according to his knowledge and basic beliefs, It understands it with a connotation and denotation that is proper, while those who receive that term can not help but translate immediately according to their representational structure, engulfing the *novum* that in itself coincides with connotation and denotation. In this way it can potentially become the expression of the receiver thought that reprocess the information with the syntax of their mindset, which in turn makes reference to a series of fundamental prepositions defining and redefining of that information.

4 THE PRAGMATIC ASPECT OF THE VIRTUAL WORLD

Defined, in some way, the semantic aspect applied to the virtual world, it must be held, likewise, if and how it changes the performative aspect of language. Performative utterances are those that involve the execution of an action. Therefore the language does not have only one function declaratory but also pragmatic, where « enunciate the phrase [...] is not to describe my doing what you would say I'm doing while I state or assert that I'm doing it is doing it. [...] It indicates that the utterance of the sentence represents the implementation of an action - is not normally designed as simply saying something » [9]. While initially J. Austin introduces dichotomous opposition between performative utterance and constative, later he realizes that this adamantine opposition is artificial because in every statement you can distinguish a performative and a declarative part. Somehow "say" is always "doing" with the important difference that if the first is determined by a value of truth, the second is determined by the conditions of success: Thus, Austin distinguishes in his speech act theory, three different actions of uttering a performative utterance.:« In other words we have distinguished the act locutionary […] that has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has a certain strength to say something; the perlocutionary act is the achieve certain effects by saying something » [10]; this distinction gave way to various investigations, including that of his pupil John Searle:

In *Expression and Meaning* [11] he investigated the conditions of success of speech acts in reference to the contextual elements such as the intention of the speaker, the party's expectations and the mutual position. The student, however, went beyond the perspective of the teacher saying that the theory of Speech Acts is implicit theory of intention, because to him in a state propositional corresponds a psychological state «since the intentionality of language should be explained in terms of intentionality of the mind, and not vice versa. In fact, sounds and signs may refer to objects and events only because the mind has imposed intentionality on them. The significance of the language is derived intentionality, and necessarily derives originally from the intentionality of the mind » [12] even though he will specify, of course, that « can not explain the intentionality of the mind saying it is exactly as the intentionality of language » [13]. This breakthrough given by American philosopher opens the debate on the social dimension of the speech because it considers that language is essentially social and makes human society essentially linguistic; the speech act is more the expression of an intention or belief, it is above all a public performance.

In this regard it is useful to the contribution of Paul Ricoeur that defines the language « not an object but a mediation [...] in three ways: First, it is the mediation of the man with the world, is that through which, by means of which express the fact there represent, in brief we have a world. The language is then mediation between man and man. It is to the extent that together we refer to the same things that we constitute ourselves in the language community, as a "we." Dialogue [...] is like a question and answer game, the final mediation between a person and the other person. Finally, the language is Mediation self with yourself. [...] The comments on the commitment of the speaker lead directly to consider the intersubjective aspect of speech. [...] This direction of speech toward each other is included in the "illocutionary force" of the act of speech. [...] The speech for which the speech is addressed to ... is contemporary to the illocution, which is what I do say. There is therefore a moral bond connected with the catch word. Speaking engagement I mean what I say according to the rules of the language community. Speaking renew implicit pact underpinning the linguistic communities. These are the close bonds that hold together the reference speech to the world, relationship to self and relationship with each other. [...] <ending> the three dimensions of language: the ontological dimension (reference in the world), the psychological dimension (ratio with him), the moral dimension (relationship with others) are strictly co-

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[2] I put this term in quotes because here you could open another area for discussion. In fact, the real world is the metasystem of reference where the virtual world axioms find their foundation making it consistent. So it would seem that we are in relationship to the virtual world as the relationship that exists between the Creator and creation. But even then it would seem to justify the fact that our *logos* is the same being of that world, is poietic.

original» [14]. Defined the undeniable ethical dimension of language, our analysis now focuses on how and where to place this dimension in the virtual world. Given the ontological premise defined in this article it seems that in virtual communication does not refer immediately to an "other" and then, in the wake of *weak references* I introduced you will consequently postpone the discussion of the empirical effects of speech acts at the "moment" which it takes place between the sender and receiver a matching on the same virtual space defined by the same language. At this point, unlike the reference, pragmatic, effective communication initiated between parties who share an understanding of the meaning, is basically the same as the real world, with the only difference that, on line, we will never have the opportunity to know if the speaker assumes his identity honestly.

5 CDT BETWEEN COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, COMMITMENT STORE AND SDRT

The public and social aspect of language with Juergen Habermas becomes a real communicative action where rationality has nothing to do with knowledge, but with the way in which subjects are able to use language knowledge. For Habermas, communicative rationality defines in a more appropriate than cognitive-instrumental rationality of responsibility and autonomy concepts, based on the ability to act on intersubjectively recognized validity claims in a speech community. So the concept of communicative rationality refers to a systematic argument understood as « type of discourse, in which participants thematize contested validity claims and try to meet them and criticize them with arguments » [Habermas, TKH p.38, tr. It. P. 74]. For Habermas a sentence is valid when we know what makes it acceptable, thus changing the very notion of rationality, by passing from monopoly of an isolated individual to shareholders of inter-cultural and linguistic communities.

According to another interesting theory of philosopher Hans Kamp, the fundamental theory of discourse (DRT), a listener constructs a mental model of the speech act as its syntax has a universe of "discourse referents", the objects of the discussion, and a series of "the speech conditions" which have the task of encoding the information arising from these referents of the speech. They form the discourse representation structure (DRS), in which the truth is obtained if the propositions used occur at the intersection of representational domains created in the speech in place by linguistic agents.

Robert Brandom in *Making it Explicit* and *Between saying and doing*, in my opinion, reconciles previous positions by saying that semantics and pragmatics of language form a basic plot where the vocabulary and social practices must be analyzed together, as belonging to a single system . I explicitly philosophical content (legal, modal and intentional) are analyzed in relation to the autonomous discursive practices consisting in the activity of giving and asking for reasons so as to find appropriate inferences evaluated by the logic, which has the role, as well as a judge, to explain the inferential properties of the conceptual activities and discursive practices. But if the logic defines the formal rigor which is a measure of the deontic value of discursive practices? The philosopher Charles Leonard Hamblin introducing the concept of commitment store (CS), tells us that the linguistic expressions should be defined in terms of instructions for achieving the "commitment store in progress", consisting of real lists of propositions that allow communication as holding together the various store open commitment by the

participants in a speech. Hamblin stresses that these commitments store should not be confused with the basic knowledge that linguistic agents already possess but are like axioms that define communicative action itself. The commitment that the linguistic agents take already starting from the choice of the terms they use in conversation and ends with the end of this. The general idea then would conceive the DRS as CS or, at least, as a partial picture of a list of commitment.

According to Brandom, semantics and pragmatics can not be analyzed separately, but, in my opinion, we can not say the same thing for the Community of Digital Talking (CDT). For this special community, defined the premises of "*weak reference*" and "*liquid identity*", you can not have domains of intersections of representational structures. By returning the problem of the deontic arbitrariness of the speaking subject, it is possible to dispense himself from time to time to create new identities according to his/her language proficiency. Again, the truth value of the virtual speech acts is sent back to the court of the "strong reference" that takes place, as mentioned above, when the sender and receiver "behind the mirror" use the same representational scheme to translate propositions in communication.

6 CONCLUSION

It would be easy to close the speech with a negative view of virtual communication, but the intent of this analysis was to try to figure out how to be able to relate, in the light of philosophical theories on language and speech acts, to the new virtual reality. In reviewing those that, in my opinion, are major nodes in the history of logic and philosophy of language in general, it has been noted as inevitably some analysis of language issues are to be reformulated. Corresponding to the "realism" of Aristotle and Aquinas, this new "*virtual realism*" began immediately to be fruitful as an observation point, allowing to translate most of the concepts of realism (formal entities and material entities).

For example, the ratio of the being because of these entities: our thinking (logos), which creates them and sustains them. By creating them it defines them. The concept of inseparable synolon in its being the form (order / sequence) and matter (bits) of digital information. The idea, more physical and metaphysical, that each end of a virtual language, once created, creates his own "heat bath" that here I have called "*peri-ontic space*", usually defined as a "subject", which going "in phase" with similar arguments attract and create special language games that define the virtual regional ontology of reference (such as blogs or forum discussions). The similarity between the pure active potential of the raw material and the virtual Aristotelian actualization of the infinite potential of our unlimited, immanent activity. The spiritual (since not dependent on any sense organ), capacity of thought which, in turn, contains "*virtualiter*" all virtual entities (at every time).

All this, and much else that I can not expose here for brevity, is the premise of an ontological order that I presupposed at the beginning of my article. Once defined the premises, you can move on to the review of the results obtained in trying to apply the theoretical references of language to the virtual world. As has been noted, the substantial difference between the real and the virtual semantics is that it suffers the weak terms of reference. Updated in their new virtual ontology they are, albeit still weakly bound to the representational structure of those who conceived them, waiting to exhaust their potential reference. This, according to the direction that the duty digital speakers assign to their representational structure and their knowledge and

basic beliefs. Communication in the classical sense is thus "save", as there is a sender with linguistic skills, a receiver with at least the same linguistic capabilities can decode the message, a transmission medium and a set of signs which may Minutes; yet the risk that this disclosure is not true is very high and is directly proportional to the arbitrariness of the speakers to adjust and re-adjust to appropriate reference domains so that they can communicate. The problem is that in fact, as long as that of the virtual communication agents not referring the same set of possible ways to the same set of signs, the communication appears, as in front of a mirror, take place privately with the only difference that the information that is reworked by its representational structure does not lose that otherness that saves us from solipsism, and which in fact turns them the only way to access virtual communication. When two virtual speakers will impose the purpose of communicating expanding the connotation of the terms in order to reduce inversely denotation, the reference of the terms and language together gradually becomes stronger via assigning to virtual communication the same characteristics of real communication, albeit with some limitations described in this paper.

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